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IN THE WAKE OF NATIONAL LEAGUE




The division of power between the federal and state govern-
ments has been a major issue in American Constitutional law
since the beginning of the republic. The early nationalist posi-
tion conceded that powers of Congress were limited to a few
general areas like national defense, foreign commerce, and do-
mestic interstate commerce. But, said the nationalists, when
Congress exercises a power granted by the Constitution,1 it need
not respect the powers and prerogatives of the states. The states'
rights theorists, however, contended that Congress normally
could not exercise its powers in ways that conflicted with state
prerogatives.' The nationalist theory has prevailed for most of
American history, especially since the years immediately preced-
ing World War II. But in 1976, the Nixon appointees to the Su-
preme Court enlisted an additional vote to reach a decision
which threatened to carve a major states' rights exception to the
long-prevailing view of congressional power. The case was Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery.3 The potential of League of
Cities for disrupting federal powers over states' rights in areas
from environmental protection to civil rights provoked much
scholarly comment. But, for the most part, the interests and val-
ues served by the national government have proved too strong to
be qualified by the interests of the states, and the states' rights
potential of League of Cities has not materialized. Develop-
ments in the case law since 1976 show that instead of permitting
the doctrinal growth of League of Cities, the federal courts have
developed several strategies for sidestepping the case or confin-
1. See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
2. See generally 1 H. STORING, 'THlE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (1981).
3. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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ing it to its narrowest implications. This article reviews these
strategies, analyzes them, and assesses their significance for the
future of this controversial decision.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1938, a New Deal Congress enacted the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act (FLSA), setting wage and hour regulations for much
of the nation's labor force.4 The Supreme Court unanimously
upheld the FLSA in United States v. Darby.5 The Act specifi-
cally excluded states and their political subdivisions from cover-
age.6 Beginning in 1961, however, a series of amendments gradu-
ally extended to public employees the minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions of the FLSA.7 In 1966, Congress re-
moved the exemption of the states and their political subdivi-
sions with respect to employees of state hospitals, schools, and
institutions for the sick, aged, or mentally ill;8 The Supreme
Court upheld this extension of the Act in Maryland v. Wirtz.9 In
1974, Congress completely removed the prior exemption of em-
ployees of state and local governments."0 The effect of the 1974
amendments was to apply the minimum wage and maximum
hour requirements of the FLSA to eleven million state and city
government employees" and to impose requirements upon the
states which were almost identical to those on employers in the
private sector.
In opposition to the 1974 amendments, the National League
of Cities, the National Governor's Conference, and several states
4. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976)). Originally, the Act applied only to employees actually en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.
5. 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941).
6. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (amended 1974).
7. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(c), 75 Stat. 65
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), (s)(1964)). The 1961 amendments expanded coverage to
include not only employees engaged in commerce, but also employees of an "enterprise"
having any employees engaged in commerce or the production of goods for commerce.
8. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102, 80 Stat.
831 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), (s)(1970)).
9. 329 U.S. 183, 193-99 (1968).
10. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 84
Stat. 55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (e), (r), (s), (x)(1976)).
11. See Brief for Appellant at 10, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976)(citing U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, PUBLIc EMPLOYMENT IN 1973 (1973)).
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brought suit against the Secretary of Labor, William J. Usery.
These plaintiffs did not deny Congress' long-acknowledged
power to regulate hours and wages in the private sector. They
claimed instead that state governments enjoyed certain immuni-
ties from federal regulation and that the hours and wages of
state employees were within those immunities, regardless of
whether Congress believed that the hours and wages of state em-
ployees exerted an effect on the nation's economy. A three-judge
district court invoked the authority of Maryland v. Wirtz and
dismissed the suit,12 but observed that the challenge to the Act
raised substantial questions about the reach of the power of
Congress under the commerce clause: "[I]t may well be that the
Supreme Court will feel it appropriate to .draw back from the
far-reaching implications of [Maryland v. Wirtz]; but that is a
decision that only the Supreme Court can make, and as a Fed-
eral district court we feel obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as
it stands."'
In the following year, the Supreme Court decided Fry v.
United States,14 a case which was to be of considerable impor-
tance to the outcome of the suit against the 1974 amendments.
In Fry, a seven to two majority upheld the constitutionality of
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.15 The Act authorized
the President to extend emergency wage and price controls to
state employees. Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall
rested the decision on the broad powers of Congress under the
commerce clause and the importance of not allowing major ex-
ceptions to a national wage and price policy.1" He rejected the
states' claim, based on the tenth amendment, that the Act ex-
ceeded the power of Congress. But in response to a strong dis-
sent from Justice Rehnquist, Marshall added the following
footnote:
Petitioners have stated their argument not in terms of the
Commerce Power, but in terms of the limitations on that
12. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974)(three-
judge court), rev'd sub nom. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
13. Id. at 828.
14. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
15. Title II of Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (expired April 30, 1974)(reprinted in
12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976)).
16. 421 U.S. at 547-48.
1983]
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power imposed by the Tenth Amendment. While the Tenth
Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered,"
• . .it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exer-
cise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite
the extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we
are convinced that the wage restriction regulation constituted
no such drastic invasion of state sovereignty.
17
Justice Rehnquist conceded in dissent that in emergency
circumstances, Congress would be empowered to regulate activi-
ties of the states in the national interest. He also claimed, how-
ever, that Congress could not do so under the commerce power
alone."' He argued further that the economic circumstances pro-
ducing the wage-price freeze in 1970 did not rise to the kind of
emergency in which other powers (such as the war powers)
might augment the power of Congress under, the commerce
clause. 19 He urged the Court to overrule Maryland v. Wirtz.Y'
League of Cities was decided the following year. The Court
rejected the 1974 amendments to the FLSA by a five to four
vote, ruling that Congress had intruded too greatly on the rights
of the states by imposing federal labor standards on state em-
ployees 2 ' Wirtz, a clear barrier to this result, was undermined
by a plurality opinion written by Justice Rehnquist.22
The decision astonished the legal community: for the first
time in forty years the Court had struck down, on grounds of
state sovereignty, an exercise of the commerce power. Although
recognizing that the establishment of wage and hour regulations
was within the scope of the commerce clause, Justice Rehnquist
contended that insofar as the regulations "operate[d] to directly
displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions, '23 they were uncon-
stitutional. In reaching this conclusion, Rehnquist explained
17. Id. at 547 n.7.
18. Id. at 558-59.
19. Id. at 559.
20. Id.
21. 426 U.S. at 845-52.
22. Id. at 855.
23, Id. at 852.
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that the tenth amendment contained an "affirmative limita-
tion" '24 on the commerce power "akin to"25 limitations in the Bill
of Rights-a limitation running in favor of "the States as
States '26 that prohibits congressional enactments threatening
the "separate and independent existence '27 of the states as "sov-
ereign political entit[ies]."2 8 The existence of this state-sover-
eignty limitation, wrote Rehnquist, has been "repeatedly recog-
nized" in the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.29
Without the right to determine the hours and wages of public
employees performing "integral governmental functions" in such
areas as "fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health, and parks and recreation," Rehnquist concluded, "there
would be little left of the States' 'separate and independent exis-
tence.' ',3o Rehnquist then went on to overrule Wirtz while af-
firming the continued validity of Fry as a case which upheld an
exercise of national power in an economic emergency.
31
In an acrimonious dissent joined by Justices White and
Marshall, Justice Brennan attacked the majority for ignoring de-
cades of precedent and for seeking to substitute its own policy
judgment for that of the legislature.2 Characterizing the Court's
reasoning as a "manufactured ... abstraction without sub-
stance, '33 Brennan predicted the opinion would "astound schol-
ars of the Constitution"3 4 because it ignored the decision of the
Court in McCulloch v. Maryland35 that (as Brennan described
it) "nothing in the Tenth Amendment constitutes a limitation
on congressional exercise of powers delegated by the Constitu-
tion to Congress. ' 36 Elsewhere in the dissent Brennan called the
decision an "exercise of raw judicial power, '37 "absurd,'38 an
24. Id. at 841.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 845.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 842.
29. Id. at 845.
30. Id. at 851.
31. Id. at 852-55.
32. Id. at 857-81.
33. Id. at 860.
34. Id. at 862.
35. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
36. 426 U.S. at 862.
37. Id. at 879.
38. Id. at 872.
19831 653
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ipse dixit,39 "pernicious, ' '40 "unworkable, "41 "mischievous ' 42 and
"catastrophic. '43 Finally, he also reminded the majority that a
similar insistence on states' rights at the expense of national
power had "provoked a constitutional crisis for the Court in the
1930's.'
Justice Stevens, the fourth member of the minority, wrote a
separate dissent, although he raised no points not contained in
the Brennan opinion.' 5 Commentators have speculated as to why
Stevens elected to file a separate dissent. One student of the de-
cision has remarked that Stevens "simply did not want to join
an opinion with Brennan's tone. ' 46 Stevens agreed with the ma-
jority that it was unwise for Congress to regulate the states in
the manner of the FLSA amendments, but he nevertheless
found himself unable to identify a clear basis for the majority's
constitutional decision.' 7 Stevens could not find a limitation on
the power of the national government over the wages and hours
of state employees that also would not invalidate other federal
laws, which he considered "unquestionably permissible," 8 such
as those requiring state compliance with federal standards in en-
vironmental protection, highway safety, and civil rights.
Justice Blackmun's qualified concurrence was of special sig-
nificance to the future of League of Cities.40 Although Blackmun
joined the majority opinion, it appears that Brennan's dissent
partially persuaded him. Blackmun therefore refused to endorse
Rehnquist's theory, preferring to reach the same result through
what he called a "balancing approach." This approach, accord-
ing to Blackmun, would not "outlaw federal power in areas such
as environmental protection in which the federal interest is de-
monstrably greater and in which state facility compliance with
39. Id.
40. Id. at 860.
41. Id. at 880.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 868.
45. Id. at 880.
46. Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery. New Meaning for the Tenth
Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 163 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Barber].
47. 426 U.S. at 880-81.
48. Id. at 881.
49. Id. at 855.
[Vol. 34654
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imposed federal standards would be essential. 5 0 Blackmun's
concurrence limited the plurality's opinion by allowing critics of
Rehnquist's theory to claim that a majority of the Court (Black-
mun and the four dissenters) had reservations about future ex-
tensions of states' rights limitations on the commerce power and
on federal power in general. If, as Brennan feared, "ominous im-
plications"5 1 of the decision ever materialized, critics could say
that a majority actually opposed a strong across-the-board affir-
mation of states' rights in League of Cities. Blackmun's concur-
rence would create pressure on courts to ignore Brennan's pessi-
mistic forebodings when applying League of Cities.
After six years of application, it is appropriate to ask how
League of Cities has fared as an instrument for restricting the
federal government's sphere of authority. For all the attention it
has attracted in the cases and commentaries, League of Cities
has proved to be a rather limited departure from the national-
ism that has dominated commerce-clause litigation for the past
forty years. The case nevertheless has influenced the way the
federal courts approach several different kinds of state chal-
lenges to federal authority.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF National League of Cities v. Usery
In his dissenting opinion in League of Cities, Justice Bren-
nan argued: (1) that if the tenth amendment limits the com-
merce clause it limits all other powers of the national govern-
ment to the same extent, but (2) since it would be unthinkable
to find tenth amendment limitations on congressional policies in
areas such as civil rights and the environment, (3) saying that
the tenth amendment limits the commerce power is mere ipse
dixit. This argument helps explain the way courts have applied
League of Cities. In cases decided since League of Cities, the
Court has neither admitted that its holding was mere ipse dixit
nor extended League of Cities into other areas, as doctrinal con-
sistency would seem to require. Recent developments indicate
that League of Cities is no more than a shotgun in the closet for
use on special occasions when the Court believes Congress has
gone too far under the commerce clause. Nor is League of Cities
50. Id.
51. Id. at 876.
1983]
7
Flax: In the Wake of National League of Cities v. Usery: A "Derelict" M
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any less than that, although it is doubtful that the case will have
an impact in areas beyond commerce.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment
Of the several issues left untouched by League of Cities, the
most important was the extent of congressional power under the
fourteenth amendment. The League of Cities majority specifi-
cally declined to express an opinion on whether Congress could
achieve "different results . . .[in] affect[ing] integral operations
of state governments by exercising authority granted to it under
other sections of the Constitution such as . . .section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. ' 52 This language left open the possibil-
ity that Congress' fourteenth amendment powers could be lim-
ited by the rationale of League of Cities. The Court, however,
foreclosed this possibility swiftly and decisively four days later
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
5 3
In Fitzpatrick, an employee of the State of Connecticut
brought a class action on behalf of current and retired male em-
ployees against several state officials, alleging that certain provi-
sions of Connecticut's retirement plan discriminated against
male employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.54 As amended in 1972 by the Equal Employment Op-
portunities Act, 5 Title VII of the 1964 Act applied to the states
as employers." Fitzpatrick claimed that Connecticut allowed
52. Id. at 852 n.17.
53. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1970 & Supp. V 1975). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 provides:
[it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Id. § 2000(e)-2(a).
55. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat.
103 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970)).
56. In the 1972 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress,
acting under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, authorized federal courts to award
monetary damages in favor of a private individual against a state government found to
[Vol. 34
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women with twenty-five years of service to retire with pension
benefits five years earlier than men, and that women retiring
with less than twenty-five years of service received higher bene-
fits than their male counterparts. Fitzpatrick asked the State to
pay retired males the difference between the female benefits and
the male benefits computed from the date of their eligibility.
In its response, Connecticut claimed that the shield of sov-
ereign immunity in the eleventh amendment limited Congres-
sional power to authorize private damage actions against the
state as a means of enforcing the fourteenth amendment." But
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the
eleventh amendment did not bar an award of backpay pension
benefits under a Title VII claim.5 8 Rehnquist said that, unlike
the power of Congress under the commerce clause, the power of
Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment is not
limited by any of the states' reserved powers. Rehnquist ex-
plained that the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amend-
ment are directed at the states in express terms and, therefore,
unlike the terms of the commerce power, they "clearly contem-
plate limitations on [the states'] authority. 5 9 He observed also
that section 5 gave Congress power to "enforce" the substantive
guarantees of th6 amendment "by appropriate legislation." 60 Of
the power of Congress to enforce the amendment, he said:
[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to section 5, not only is it exer-
cising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of
the constitutional grant, it is exercising that authority under
one section of a constitutional amendment whose other sec-
tions by their own terms embody limitations on state author-
ity.... Congress may, in determining what is "appropriate"
legislation for the purpose of enforcing the . . . Fourteenth
have subjected that person to employment discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Id.
57. 427 U.S. at 451. Relying on Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), the state
argued that the eleventh amendment barred any order prescribing retroactive damages
against the state. Edelman had held that a suit by welfare clients for past benefits
wrongfully withheld could not be maintained against the state. Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion for the court in Fitzpatrick distinguished Edelman on the ground that neither of the
federal statutes underlying the welfare program in issue in Edelman had authorized suits
against a state. 427 U.S. at 451-52.
58. Id. at 456.
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Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other
contexts."
Strictly speaking, League of Cities and Fitzpatrick decided
two different issues: League of Cities considered a tenth amend-
ment limitation upon the commerce clause; Fitzpatrick decided
whether there was an eleventh amendment limitation upon the
fourteenth amendment. But since both addressed a conflict be-
tween congressional power and state sovereignty, the result in
Fitzpatrick indicates that League of Cities was not designed as
the foundation of a new and general constitutional principle re-
quiring Congress to respect all claims to state sovereignty over
state employees. One can surely say that if such a general princi-
ple had been the intended promise of League of Cities, the
Court reneged on that promise quickly and definitely in
Fitzpatrick.
Although Justice Rehnquist attempted a meaningful dis-
tinction between the decisions in Fitzpatrick and League of Cit-
ies, the distinction is more apparent than real. Rehnquist
claimed that the fourteenth amendment was an explicit limita-
tion on the power of the states. He saw the commerce power as
weaker, visa-vis state power, because the commerce power is not
an explicit limitation on the states. But in making this argu-
ment, Rehnquist ignored the fact that when a clash occurs be-
tween the commerce power and "anything in the Constitution or
Laws of any State,"'62 the supremacy clause reinforces the com-
merce clause and explicitly limits the powers of the states.
Therefore, despite rhetoric about the uniqueness of the four-
teenth amendment compared to the commerce clause, Fitzpat-
rick simply contradicts League of Cities.
Furthermore, comparison of the tenth and eleventh amend-
ments reinforces the significance of Fitzpatrick. Unlike the
tenth amendment, the eleventh amendment is an explicit asser-
tion of states' rights, proposed and ratified because the states
insisted upon a reaffirmation of their sovereignty in the face of
what they believed was an act of usurpation by the federal judi-
61. Id. at 456.
62. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
658 [Vol. 34
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ciary.6 3 In light of its history, one can view the eleventh amend-
ment as a stronger expression of the principle of state sover-
eignty than the tenth amendment. Indeed, prior to League of
Cities, the conventional view was that the tenth amendment was
less an assertion of state sovereignty than a reminder that Con-
gress could exercise only those powers" which it had been
granted, without any implications concerning states' rights limi-
tations upon those powers.6 4 This was the view of Justice Story
who in 1883 formulated what has proved to be the most authori-
tative interpretation of the tenth amendment:
This amendment is a mere affirmation of what, upon any just
reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting the Constitution.
... It is plain, therefore, that it could not have been the
intention of the framers of this amendment to give it effect as
an abridgement of any of the powers granted under the Consti-
tution, whether they are express of implied, direct or inciden-
tal. Its sole design is to exclude any interpretation by which
other powers should be assumed beyond those which are
granted.... The attempts then which have been made from
time to time to force upon this language an unabridging or re-
strictive influence are utterly unfounded.
65
One need not commit oneself to Story's influential interpreta-
tion of the tenth amendment in order to recognize that from
both its language and history, the eleventh amendment is clearly
a stronger assertion of state sovereignty than the tenth amend-
63. In the late 1700s the scope of authority of the federal courts with respect to the
states was a subject of bitter controversy. The controversy reached its peak when, in
1793, citizens of South Carolina brought in the Supreme Court, a suit against the State
of Georgia to collect a debt owed an estate. Georgia stood on the proposition that, since a
state is sovereign, it cannot be sued in any court without its consent. When the Supreme
Court, in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), decided for the citizens of
South Carolina, the resentment of a number of states at the affront to state sovereignty
involved in permitting suits against states by mere citizens was sufficient to bring about
the adoption of the eleventh amendment in 1798. The eleventh amendment withdrew
from the federal courts jurisdiction in suits against states brought by citizens of other
states or foreign countries. The ruling in Chisholm was overturned with the adoption of
the eleventh amendment.
64. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTrION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1851) [hereinafter cited as STORY]; see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941); Berns, The Meaning of the Tenth Amendment, in A NATION OF STATES 145 (R.
Goldwin ed. 1961); Castro, The Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W.
VA. L. REv. 227 (1949).
65. STORY, supra note 64, at §§ 1906-08.
1983]
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ment. For, unlike the tenth amendment, one cannot read the
eleventh amendment as anything other than a limitation on na-
tional power.
In sum, within a week of Justice Rehnquist's announcement
of the state sovereignty doctrine in League of Cities, he led the
Court to affirm that, relative to states rights, congressional
power under the fourteenth amendment was without limits.
Clearly, Fitzpatrick signaled that League of Cities was not to be
taken as an instance of a new constitutional principle concerning
the relative scope of state and federal powers."6
B. Civil Rights Legislation
The civil rights legislation most obviously vulnerable to
challenge after League of Cities were two other amendments to
the Fair Labor Standards Act: the Equal Pay Act of 1963
(EPA),6 7 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 (ADEA).6 8 These acts prohibit sex discrimination in the
payment of wages and age discrimination in the hiring of em-
ployees. Enacted under the commerce clause, 9 the EPA and
ADEA were based upon congressional findings that sex and age
discrimination have a substantial adverse impact on interstate
commerce. Congress chose to remedy this situation by requiring
that employers award equal pay for equal work and hire accord-
ing to individual merit, rather than on presumptions about the
66. See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (court held that
the tenth amendment places no restrictions on congressional power "to enforce the Civil
War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation' ").
67. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Act bars an employer from discriminating:
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees.., at a
rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex
... for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, ef-
fort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working
conditions.
Id. at § 206(d)(1).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (Supp. IV 1974). The ADEA makes it unlawful for "an em-
ployer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment because of such individual's age." Id. at § 623(a).
69. Although the EPA and the ADEA are primarily anti-discrimination measures,
they were enacted under the commerce clause and not under the fourteenth amendment.
The commerce clause was used because the FLSA originally applied only to private em-
ployers who are beyond the reach of the fourteenth amendment.
[Vol. 34
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effects of age on ability.70
When enacted in 1963, the EPA, as part of the FLSA, cov-
ered only employees in the private sector; states and their politi-
70. A confusing characteristic of much modern civil rights legislation is its complex
constitutional foundations in both the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause.
In the decade following the Civil War, the radical Reconstruction Congress passed a
number of civil rights laws which evinced its view that the Civil War had effectively
transferred the power to define and protect the civil rights of individuals from the states
to the national government. An example of such legislation was the Civil Rights Act of
1875 making it a federal offense for proprietors of inns, theaters, transportation facilities,
and other "public accommodations" to discriminate against any potential customer on
the grounds of race. The Supreme Court opposed much of this legislation either through
restrictive interpretation or outright invalidation. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883), the Court moved to restore some of the states' powers by holding that Congress
could outlaw only discriminatory state laws and other state activities, not private action.
The Court thus declared unconstitutional the public accommodations provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 as aimed not at correcting deliberate acts of official discrimina-
tion but at acts of "private" discrimination beyond the scope of the fourteenth amend-
ment. With this decision, the fourteenth amendment ceased to be an effective basis for
congressional action and became a set of judicial criteria for invalidating state laws and
practices found to be deliberately discriminatory. In theory, "corrective legislation" was
held to be authorized by the fourteenth amendment. All that could be corrected, how-
ever, was state action, not private discrimination. The best corrective for state action was
simple invalidation by the federal courts.
This transfer of power from Congress to the courts went unopposed as the Recon-
struction zeal dissipated in the 1880's; indeed, in 1894, Congress itself repealed the most
important of the Reconstruction civil rights laws that the courts had not voided or weak-
ened. Following the assassination of President Kennedy, however, there was a resurgence
of congressional concern for protecting civil rights, and Congress once again enacted civil
rights laws aimed at preventing racial discrimination in public accommodations. Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Act was similar to the Act of 1875 that the Court
struck down in the Civil Rights Cases. Thus, Congress faced the problem of locating a
constitutional basis for a new assault on discrimination in public accommodations. That
foundation proved to be the commerce clause, on the argument that discrimination in
public accommodations had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to warrant an ex-
ercise of the commerce power.
While Congress took pains to rationalize the 1964 Civil Rights Act as an exercise of
the commerce power, the statute also cited the enforcement provisions of the fourteenth
amendment, thereby inviting the Warren Court to overrule the Civil Rights Cases. But
the Court declined that invitation in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964), and upheld the Act under the commerce clause without deciding its constitu-
tionality under the fourteenth amendment. In basing this Act partly on the commerce
power, Congress provided a way to avoid a conflict with the Civil Rights Cases because
Congress does have the power to reach private activity under the commerce power. Much
modern civil rights legislation follows the precedent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by
grounding its action both in the fourteenth amendment and the commerce clause. How-
ever, some of the legislation in the cases that follow in this article are civil rights laws
enacted solely under the commerce power. This did not stop the courts from upholding
them. See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
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cal subdivisions were specifically excluded from its coverage.71 In
1966, however, Congress expanded the definition of the term
"employer" in the FLSA to include state and local governmental
workers employed in state hospitals, schools, and institutions for
the sick, aged, or mentally ill.72 In 1974 Congress further ex-
panded coverage to employees of any "public agency," defined
broadly as "the government of a State or political subdivision
thereof; any agency. .. [of] a State, or political subdivision of a
State; or any interstate governmental agency. 73 Thus, the 1974
amendments extended the application of the FLSA, including
the EPA and the ADEA, to nearly all state and local
governments.
In League of Cities, the Court found the minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA unconstitutional as
applied to state and local governmental employees. Although
League of Cities did not discuss the EPA and the ADEA, they
were enacted by Congress under the commerce power and thus
were open to the same constitutional objections that brought
down the hour and wage standards that applied to the states.
Inevitably, the states challenged the applicability of the EPA
and the ADEA on the authority of League of Cities.
A federal district court in Iowa was the first to confront the
question of whether Congress had the power under the com-
merce clause to extend the Equal Pay Act to the states. 4 Female
employees of a state university charged that they had been dis-
criminated against in violation of the Act. The State contended
that by striking down the 1974 amendments that had extended
the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the FSLA,
the Court, in League of Cities, had struck down all the 1974
amendments that applied to the states-including the EPA. But
the district court rejected this argument, and held instead that
applying the EPA to the states pursuant to the commerce clause
was constitutional. The court reached this conclusion by reason-
ing that discrimination in pay cannot validly be considered a
"fundamental employment decision" essential to the separate
71. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r), (s) (1970); See supra notes 4-11 and accompanying text.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (Supp. V 1975).
74. Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
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and independent existence of the state.7 5 The court also noted
that sex discrimination was not an attribute of state sovereignty
within the purview of the tenth amendment .7  The court nar-
rowly interpreted the League of Cities holding, stating that the
decision "should be confined strictly to its factual context.
'7 7
A Texas district court employed a similar argument in re-
jecting a challenge by a school district against application of the
EPA. 8 In the Texas case, as in the Iowa case, the court ruled
that League of Cities should be applied "very conservatively"
because, while effecting "a modest resurrection of state sover-
eignty," the decision was not intended "to generally and funda-
mentally alter the balance of state and federal power. ' '7 With
respect to the EPA and other provisions of the FLSA not at is-
sue in League of Cities, the court stated that "[n]owhere in Na-
tional League of Cities does the Court indicate that the entire
Fair Labor Standards Act is now a nullity as applied to states
and municipalities."80 Finally, the court added that any tenth
amendment limitation on the commerce power was subject to
three conditions: the state functions protected must be of an
"internal, administrative, management, or housekeeping" char-
acter; the exercise of the commerce power must substantially
disrupt state operations; and the state interests must outweigh
countervailing national policy.8 1 Following the lead of Fitzpat-
rick, the court held that the EPA could be upheld under the
fourteenth amendment,82 that there was no essential state func-
75. Id. at 425.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 424.
78. Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Texas 1976).
79. Id. at 114.
80. Id. at 113. The constitutional defects of the minimum wage and maximum hour
provisions did not invalidate the entire FLSA because Congress regularly inserts a sepa-
rability clause in legislation to prevent judicial invalidation of one section from voiding
the statute as a whole. See 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970).
81. 421 F. Supp. at 115-16.
82. Id. at 114. With respect to the fourteenth amendment, the court stated: "[i]f the
Equal Pay Act could also be plausibly sustained by any other Congressional power, such
as the Fourteenth Amendment, courts would be bound to sustain it on the latter basis."
Id. The court also noted that "[li]t does not matter that Congress relied specifically on
the Commerce Clause. The maxim of judicial review is well-established that enactments
by Congress are presumptively constitutional. If a court can sustain legislation on the
basis of any power in the Constitution, it will do so. One attacking a Congressional en-
actment must demonstrate either that it lacks any plausible basis in the Constitution or
1983]
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tion involving sex discrmination,as and that even if Congress
were viewed as having acted under the commerce clause, the
federal interest outweighed that of the states. 4
Most lower courts have adopted the same strategy in cases
involving the ADEA. In the face of challenges invoking League
of Cities most courts have taken one of two approaches: they
have assumed (1) that the Act was passed under the commerce
power and held that the federal interest outweighs the state in-
terest, or (2) that the statute was passed under the fourteenth
that it violates a specific limitation in the Constitution." Id. at 114 n.3.
83. Id. at 116.
84. Id. at 116 & n.7. In addition to the Christensen and Dallas decisions, the follow-
ing cases have upheld the applicability of the Equal Pay Act to a state or a political
subdivision of a state against a League of Cities challenge: Pearce v. Wichita County, 590
F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Kent State Univ., 589 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1978);
Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Charleston County
School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544
F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair
and Exposition Authority, 435 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer
Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Brown v. County of Santa Barbara,
427 F. Supp. 112 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F.
Supp. 637 (S.D. Iowa 1976). In Howard v. Ward County, 418 F. Supp. 494 (D.N.D. 1976)
and Usery v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Ky. 1976), the
district courts held for the states on this issue. The two contrary holdings are of interest.
In Howard, a female deputy sheriff complained of salary discrimination based on sex and
claimed jurisdiction under and violations of both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The
court held that the latter was not applicable to defendant on the basis of League of
Cities: "Since the Equal Pay Act is part of the FLSA and takes its definition of 'em-
ployer' therefrom, it follows that the Defendants are not 'employers' within the coverage
of the Equal Pay Act." 418 F. Supp. at 500. As to Howard's Title VII claim, the court
declared that the county and the sheriff were "employers" for Title VII purposes and
held that "the coverage of state and local governments under Title VII is within Con-
gressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the basis upon which Congress ex-
tended coverage to these entities." Id. at 501. The district court found that there had
been a sex-based salary discrimination in violation of Title VII, and Deputy Howard was
awarded monetary and injunctive relief. No appeal was taken from the adverse decision
in this case. Howard obviously would not appeal and the Secretary of Labor, not being a
party, could not. In Owensboro-Daviess, the district court relied on an overly simplistic
line of reasoning: the FLSA embodied a single definition of "employer" which League of
Cities had ruled to be inapplicable to states insofar as standards of minimum pay and
maximum hours were concerned and that the FLSA's separability clause could not prac-
tically be applied to accord one definition to employer in that type of case and another in
an equal pay case. In this case, the judge refused to "reach out for the Fourteenth
Amendment" as an aid in construing amendments to the Act. 423 F. Supp. at 846. This
decision was overruled in Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hasp., 581 F.2d 116
(6th Cir. 1978). Here the court found in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment a consti-
tutional basis for applying the Equal Pay Act to state and local governments as
employers.
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amendment, in which no states' rights limitation exists. An ex-
ample of the first approach is the opinion in a Utah case con-
struing League of Cities "to require balancing of state and fed-
eral interests . . . even where integral state governmental
functions may be affected." 85 In that case a federal district court
held that the commerce clause permitted Congress to regulate
state employment practices because "the national interest in
employment significantly outweigh[ed] the state's interest in
discriminatory employment policies and practices."86 An exam-
ple of the second approach is a North Dakota case in which a
district court found it "unnecessary to engage in a balancing of
. . . state and federal interests" because the ADEA was author-
ized by the fourteenth amendment.
8 7
Contrary to this pattern, a Wyoming district court ruled
that Congress violated the tenth amendment when it made the
ADEA applicable to state and local government employees. 88
The court refused to reach out for the fourteenth amendment in
this case, finding "not a word or even a smidgen""9 in the 1974
amendments to suggest that Congress, in extending the ADEA
to the states, was acting under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment and not under the commerce power.90 To support
this position, the court relied on language from the Supreme
Court's opinion in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman,91 in which Justice Rehnquist stated that courts
"should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to
85. Usery v. Salt Lake City Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 720 (D. Utah 1976).
86. Id. at 720.
87. Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 916 (D.N. Dak. 1977). The follow-
ing cases have also upheld the applicability of the ADEA to a state or a political subdivi-
sion of a state: Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Equal Employment Op-
portunities Comm'n v. County of Los Angeles, 526 F. Supp. 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1981);
Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80 (M.D. Ala. 1981); United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n v. County of Calumet, 519 F. Supp. 195 (E.D. Wis. 1981); Marshall
v. Delaware River and Bay Authority, 471 F. Supp. 886 (D. Del. 1979); Aaron v. Davis,
424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976).
88. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D.
Wyo. 1981); See also Taylor v. Dep't of Fish and Game, 523 F. Supp. 514 (D. Mont.
1981).
89. 514 F. Supp. at 599.
90. Having concluded that the ADEA was passed only under the commerce clause,
the court found that, on balance, the state's interest in fit law officers outweighs the
EEOC's claim of a larger national interest. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
91. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. '9 2 Notwithstanding the Wyoming court's use of the Pen-
nhurst dictum, Rehnquist's statement may have limited applica-
tion because the statute under review in Pennhurst imposed
what Rehnquist called "massive financial obligations on the
States"9' 3 and because Rehnquist did review the legislative his-
tory in reaching the decision despite an absence of an explicit
statutory intent to act under the fourteenth amendment."' By
reviewing the legislative history, Rehnquist effectively acknowl-
edged that the absence of explicit statutory language is in itself
insufficient to determine questions of legislative intent. In the
case of the ADEA, moreover, it appears that evidence of con-
gressional intent is in the eyes of the beholder. Less than a
month after the Wyoming district court found "nothing in the
1974 FLSA Amendments or their legislative history to suggest
that Congress acted pursuant to any other power than the Com-
merce Clause, ' 95 a Wisconsin district court concluded that the
ADEA's legislative history was "rife with indications that Con-
gress did indeed intend to exercise its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power."9" The question of the ADEA's application
to the states will be settled by the Supreme Court in the 1982-83
term when the Court hears the federal government's appeal in
the Wyoming case. 7 The case may provide the occasion for a
clash between two conservative inclinations: (1) diminishing
federal power over the states-an objective that would favor a
commerce-power interpretation of the ADEA, and (2) practicing
judicial self restraint-an objective that would obligate the
Court to give the Act a fourteenth amendment construction that
would save it.98
Just as civil rights acts of Congress have survived League of
Cities challenges, so have the school desegregation policies of the
92. Id. at 16.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 18-22.
95. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
96. United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. County of Calumet,
519 F. Supp. 195, 198 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
97. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D.
Wyo. 1981), prob. juris. noted, 454 U.S. 1140 (1982).
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federal courts pursuant to the historic policy announced in
Brown v. Board of Education.9 9 In Milliken v. Bradley,100 the
governor of Michigan opposed a federal district court order re-
quiring Michigan to provide funds for remedial education pro-
grams in order to remedy past acts of official school discrimina-
tion. The State argued that both the tenth and eleventh
amendments prevented federal courts from mandating that
states spend money for remedial programs.10 1 The Supreme
Court dismissed the State's argument, holding that, since there
had been a finding of unconstitutional state action, the federal
district court could order an expenditure of state funds to rem-
edy the unconstitutional action.10 2 In rejecting the argument
that a state sovereignty limitation existed on the equity powers
of federal courts, the Court followed the lead of Fitzpatrick by
affirming that there is no states' rights limitation on federal
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment.
10 3
C. The Taxing Power
After League of Cities, one might have expected the Court
to expand the scope of state immunity to federal taxation di-
rectly affecting essential state functions. The Court, in Massa-
chusetts v. United States,10' however, retreated from this oppor-
tunity, rejecting a states' rights limitation on the taxing power.
This case arose from a conflict between two lower court deci-
sions concerning the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970.105
As part of a comprehensive program to recoup the costs of fed-
eral aviation services from those who use the national air sys-
tem, Congress passed an act which imposed an annual registra-
tion tax on all civil aircraft-including those owned by the states
and the federal government. The states of Massachusetts and
Georgia protested the tax and instituted refund actions contend-
ing, on the authority of League of Cities, that the United States
could not constitutionally impose a tax on state-owned helicop-
99. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
100. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
101. Id. 288-91.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 291.
104. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
105. 26 U.S.C. § 4491 (1970).
1983] 667
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ters used for police work. A Massachusetts district court dis-
missed Massachusetts' complaint, and the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed, holding that the registration tax was
an airport user charge which did not raise the constitutional is-
sue of implied constitutional immunity of the states from the
federal taxation."" A federal district court in Georgia, on the
other hand, held the aircraft registration tax unconstitutional as
applied to state aircraft for the purpose of carrying out essential
police functions.
10 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Massachusetts v.
United States to resolve the conflict between these two deci-
sions.108 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan upheld the tax
and rejected the State's League of Cities argument with essen-
tially the same argument he propounded in his League of Cities
dissent: that some federal-state conflicts are best adjusted by the
political process, which is well-adapted to the protection of state
interests. He argued that although League of Cities had rejected
a judgment of the political process in a case involving the com-
merce power, that did not determine the proper scope of the
taxing power.109 In support of this position, he quoted from
Helvering v. Gerhardt:110 "The Congress, composed as it is of
members chosen by state constituencies, constitutes an inherent
check against the possibility of abusive taxing of the states by
the National Government." 11 Brennan dismissed the view that
the aircraft registration tax would seriously affect the perform-
ance of essential functions of the states. He said:
So long as the charges do not discriminate against state func-
tions, are based on a fair approximation of [the States'] use of
the system, and are structured to produce revenues that will
not exceed the total cost to the Federal Government of the
benefits to be supplied, there can be no substantial basis for a
claim that the National Government will be using its taxing
powers to control, unduly interfere with, or destroy a State's
ability to perform essential services.11
106. 548 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 432 U.S. 905 (1977).
107. Georgia Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
108. 435 U.S. at 453,
109. Id. at 456 n.13.
110. 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
111. 435 U.S. at 456.
112. Id. at 466-67. The decisive votes in Massachusetts v. United States were those
[Vol. 34
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Thus, despite what may initially have appeared as a revival of
the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity in League of
Cities, the immunity argument has not been successful in subse-
quent cases.
D. The Spending Power
We turn now to the question of how League of Cities has
affected the long-standing congressional practice of conditioning
federal aid to the states on their compliance with federal regula-
tions. The spending power has proven to be "an effective tool for
eroding the concept of federalism inherent in the tenth amend-
ment." 113 Although in League of Cities, the Court expressly re-
frained from deciding whether Congress could achieve a mini-
mum wage for state employees through the spending power,""
the spending power would appear particularly vulnerable to a
League of Cities attack. So far, however, League of Cities has
not moved the federal courts to limit the spending power.
In Dupler v. City of Portland,"5 a federal district court in
Maine was the first after League of Cities to reject a tenth
amendment challenge to an exercise of the spending power. In
Dupler, officials of two Maine municipalities reduced Marlene
Dupler's welfare benefits because she had received federal food
stamps. The district court held the officials in violation of the
Federal Food Stamp Act,"1" the purpose of which was to raise,
not merely to maintain, preexisting levels of nutrition. Portland
contended that this construction of the Act infringed upon an
exclusive state domain-welfare eligibility-contrary to League
of Cities. The court held League of Cities inapplicable since it
found that "[f]ederally-imposed restrictions on state and local
government activities which accompany federal grants adminis-
tered by the states have long been regarded as unobjectionable
of Justices Stewart and Powell, who had joined the majority in League of Cities. The
Justices concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion only insofar as it held that "a nondis-
criminatory user fee may constitutionally be imposed upon a State. . . ." Id. at 470.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented. Id. at 471. Justice Black-
mun took no part in the case. Id. at 470.
113. See Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits,
70 Nw. U. L. REv. 293, 297 (1975).
114. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
115. 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976).
116. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-26 (Supp. 1976).
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exercises of the Spending Power."11 The court found that, un-
like the FLSA amendments, the requirements of the Federal
Food Stamp Act were not mandatory, but were imposed on state
and local governments only as a condition of participaion in the
food stamp program. Because the decision whether to partici-
pate was voluntary and there was no requirement that a state
participate, the court concluded that there was no coercion and,
therefore, no possible interference with state sovereignty.11
More recently, in North Carolina v. Califano, 9 the Su-
preme Court summarily affirmed a district court decision up-
holding federal conditions imposed upon state health-care facili-
ties, even though the North Carolina Supreme Court had found
those conditions in violation of the state constitution. 20 As a re-
sult, the State had to choose between amending its constitution
or forgoing federal aid under forty-two federal health assistance
programs.1 2 The pattern of the decisions in these two cases
makes it most unlikely that League of Cities will have an impact
on the spending power. The logic of this situation is not easy to
discern, however, since the argument that conditional grants in
aid do not coerce the states into accepting federal policies is
clearly a legal fiction.1
22
E. The First Amendment
The Supreme Court cited League of Cities, though only inciden-
tally, in one first amendment case. In Elrod v. Burns, 23 the
Court held that the first amendment restricted the right of a
newly-elected Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, to discharge non-
civil service employees of the Sheriff's Office simply because
they were members of the political party that was defeated in
117. 421 F. Supp. at 1320.
118. Id. at 1320 n.8.
119. 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
120. 445 F. Supp. 532, 533 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
121. Id. at 535.
122. The Court held in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), that Congress
cannot regulate activities by coercive use of the spending power. But in Steward Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-91 (1937), the Court held that whenever a condi-
tional grant-in-aid is related to a legitimate national purpose, inducement or temptation
to conform did not go beyond the bounds of the federal government's legitimate spend-
ing power and was not coercion in any constitutional sense.
123. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
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the last election. Chief Justice Burger dissented because he be-
lieved that regulations on systems of political patronage were re-
served to the states by the tenth amendment. Burger pointed
out that "[o]nly last week, in National League of Cities v. Usery
. . . we took steps to arrest the downgrading of States to a role
comparable to the departments of France, governed entirely out
of the national capital.1124 Burger thus suggested that federal
courts should consider state-sovereignty when defining the scope
of first amendment rights. None of the other justices joined the
Chief Justice in this suggestion, although Justices Powell and
Rehnquist found other grounds for dissent.
F. The Commerce Power
The Supreme Court has considered and rejected League of
Cities challenges to exercises of the commerce power in three
areas: environmental protection, energy, and what might be
called federal regulation of state proprietary activities. The
Court's decisions in these cases are obviously important in as-
sessing the general fate of League of Cities because League of
Cities was itself a case arising under the commerce clause. In
cases like Fitzpatrick and Massachusetts v. United States, the
Court stated that a states' rights doctrine developed under the
commerce clause was not intended to apply to other areas, such
as civil rights and taxation. No such rationale is available for
bypassing League of Cities in commerce clause litigation, and it
is in this area that the Court has shown most clearly its policy of
confining League of Cities to the narrowest possible compass.
1. Environmental Protection
In his League of Cities concurrence, Justice Blackmun indi-
cated that he would have reached a different result in a balanc-
ing of state and federal interests in an area like environmental
protection "where the federal interest is demonstrably greater
and where state facility compliance with imposed federal stan-
dards would be essential." 25 The Court has accepted Black-
mun's assessment thus far.
124. Id. at 375.
125. 426 U.S. at 856.
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The federal environmental regulations that have attracted
the principal League of Cities challenges are the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970,128 and the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977.27 The Clean Air Amendments were
the product of fifteen years of congressional efforts to strike a
proper balance between national and state participation in an
anti-pollution program. The initial policy of Congress was to of-
fer the states aid to speed compliance with air quality standards,
while minimizing direct federal intervention. 12 As national con-
cern with environmental problems mounted and the inadequacy
of state and local efforts became apparent, however, Congress
became more involved.129 With the passage of the 1970 Clean Air
Amendments, the federal government assumed a dominant role
in the area of environmental protection by openly threatening
federal regulation and preemption where states failed to enact
air pollution controls of their own.' s° The 1970 Amendments em-
powered the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to estab-
lish the maximum levels for specific air pollutants and to require
each state to submit a plan for "implementation, maintenance,
and enforcement" of the standards. s1 If a state failed to submit
a plan to the EPA or if a state plan filed to meet the standards,
the EPA was authorized to prepare and enforce a substitute
plan.1 3 2 Notwithstanding this clear assertion of federal domi-
nance, a section of the statute disingenuously declared that state
and local governments were left with "primary responsibility"
for establishing and implementing their own air quality
programs. 33
In Friends of the Earth v. Carey,34 the Second Circuit
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-10 (Supp. 1981).
127. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. I 1977).
128. See 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
129. See The Clean Air Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 392 (1963), which, for the first time,
gave the federal government a limited role in the enforcement of anti-pollution regula-
tions. See also 79 Stat. 992 (1965); 80 Stat. 954 (1966); 81 Stat. 485 (1967); Kramer, The
1970 Clean Air Amendments: Federalism in Action or Inaction?, 6 Tax. TeCH. L. REv.
47, 49.58 (1974).
130. See Train v. National Resources Defense Counsel Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64-65
(1975).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)(Supp. 1981).
132. Id. § 7410(c)(1).
133. Id. § 7407(a).
134. 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
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Court of Appeals considered a suit under the Clean Air Act to
compel New York City to enforce an automobile pollution con-
trol plan submitted by New York State to the EPA pursuant to
the 1970 Amendments. As did the plaintiffs in League of Cities,
the City accepted the proposition that Congress was regulating
an area well within the federal government's commerce power.13 5
The City conceded that Congress undeniably had the power to
enact federal pollution standards to protect the public health
since pollution is "interstate in character and effect."13 The
City nevertheless claimed that this admittedly valid exercise of
the commerce power impermissibly interfered with integral gov-
ernmental functions of the state and its local governments. The
City contended that enforcement of the pollution control plan
violated its tenth amendment rights by interfering with its gov-
ernmental interests in "allocating funds, police resources, and in
making policy decisions. "137 In an opinion that was less than
candid about the obvious impact of the Act on state policies, the
court of appeals rejected the City's defense and held that the
pollution control plan did not displace the City's policy choices
because the EPA only approved a plan which was made by the
City itself.138 The court stated the City "entered into a pact
based on cooperative federalism under which it made the essen-
tial policy choices and determined the procedures that should be
adopted by it .. . to comply with federal pollution standards
which Congress undisputably had the power to enact under the
Commerce Clause."139 In return, said the court, the City received
the assurance that the federal government would not substitute
or enforce its own plan.1 40 The court found that this scheme did
not "impermissibly interfere with the governmental functions of
the State or its subordinate arm, the City. 14 In a more respon-
sible part of its opinion, the court employed Justice Blackmun's
balacing approach in League of Cities by describing the Clean
Air Act as a measure directed toward "a significant national
135. Id. at 37.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 33.
138. Id. at 37-38.
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health and safety problem."' 42 This would have been enough to
uphold the Act without the pretense that what is federal control
in reality is not federal control in law. 14 3
The Supreme Court considered the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Association."4 The Act required the Secretary of
the Interior to establish a regulatory program for surface mining
of coal in each state, either by accepting state programs meeting
minimum federal standards or by adopting a federal program for
states not submitting qualified programs.'45 A federal district
judge in Virginia, relying on League of Cities, held that portions
of the Act interfered with state autonomy.'46 The Supreme
Court reversed. In a statement summarizing the Court's current
approach to tenth amendment challenges to enactments under
the commerce clause, Justice Marshall stated:
in order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power
legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of
Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there
must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
"States as States ... ." Second, the federal regulation must
address matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sov-
ereignty... ." And third, it must be apparent that the States'
compliance with the federal law would directly impair their
ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
functions.
1" 7
In an important footnote Marshall added: "[d]emonstrating that
these three requirements are met does not, however, guarantee
that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional commerce
power action will succeed; there are situations in which the na-
ture of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies
142. Id. at 39.
143. Other courts have employed the same strategy of asserting that state participa-
tion in federal regulatory programs which threaten usurpation of regulatory roles if the
state does not comply with mandatory minimum standards is voluntary. See, e.g., Sierra
Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977);
United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1979).
144. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
145. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1253, 1254 (Supp. I. 1977).
146. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980).
147. 452 U.S. at 287-88 (citations omitted).
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state submission."148 This footnote supports Justice Blackmun's
balancing test by indicating that even state decisions of the most
integral variety must yield to dominant national interests.
The heart of the plaintiff's tenth amendment argument in
Hodel was that the federal reclamation program displaced state
land use policies, a traditional area of state control.149 Justice
Marshall argued that this challenge failed to satisfy the first of
his four-part test-a showing that the federal government was
regulating the state as a state. 150 Marshall observed that the
reclamatation program affected private mining companies.' 15 He
then argued that, unlike the situation in League of Cities, Con-
gress did not compel action by the states in the reclamation pro-
gram because the Act provided for direct federal control of land
reclamation in cases in which the states elected not to act in
accordance with federal standards. 52 Congress' displacement of
the states in a traditional area of state control was not sufficient
for a League of Cities challenge. Whenever any one of the four
conditions was not met, Congress was free to displace state au-
thority over private activity if the activity were found to affect
interstate commerce. 53 Justice Marshall added: "[t]he court
must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity
affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for
such a finding.' 1 54 By this reasoning Justice Marshall removed
all doubts about the narrow compass of League of Cities.
One can be excused for taking Justice Rehnquist's concur-
rence in Hodel as an expression of frustrated expectations for
the future of states' rights after League of Cities. 55 In his dis-
sent in League of Cities, Justice Brennan argued that state's
control over the wages of its employees was no more integral to
its sovereignty than the state's control over the wages of any
other workers in its jurisdiction. 56 Brennan made this point to
show the broader threat to national authority in League of Cit-
148. Id. at 288. n.29 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 284-85.
150. Id. at 287-88.
151. Id. at 288.
152. Id. at 288-89.
153. Id. at 276-93.
154. Id. at 276 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 307-13.
156. 426 U.S. at 873-75.
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ies: if Congress is not free to control the wages of state employ-
ees that affect commerce, then there is no reason to permit Con-
gress to control the wages of private-sector employees that affect
commerce. Countering this point, Rehnquist insisted that
League of Cities had no implications for Congressional power
over private activity and that only federal regulation of the state
as state was objectionable. 157 Thus, in Hodel, Marshall quoted
extensively from Rehnquist's opinion in League of Cities.158
Although he concurred in Hodel, Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion portends future battles for the cause of states' rights. His
concurrence began with the sardonic remark that:
[i]t is illuminating for purposes of reflection, if not for argu-
ment, to note that one of the greatest "fictions" of our federal
system is that Congress exercises only those powers delegated
to it, while the remainder are reserved to the States or to the
people. The manner in which this Court has construed the
Commerce Clause amply illustrates the extent of this fiction.
Although it is clear that the people, through the States, dele-
gated authority to Congress to "regulate Commerce. . . among
the several States," . . . one could easily get the sense from
this Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at the
sufferance of Congress. 159
He then sketched a series of cases illustrating what he consid-
ered the expansion of the commerce power from the power to
regulate "interstate commerce itself"'160 to the power to exclude
goods from commerce on moral grounds and regulate intrastate
activities with a cumulative effect upon commerce."6' But he in-
sisted that despite these cases ("and the broad dicta often con-
tained therein,") 62 interstate activity must have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, not just any effect,11 3 as the ma-
jority's opinion in Hodel may have suggested. Rehnquist indi-
cated that while he may have "read too much into the Court's
choice of language, '164 it was necessary to remind the Court of
157. Id. at 840-41, 844-45.
158. 452 U.S. at 286-87, 291-92.
159. Id. at 307-08.
160. Id. at 308.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 309.
163. Id. at 310-12.
164. Id. at 312.
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the need for a substantial effect upon interstate commerce lest
there be nothing left of the states' reserved powers over private
activity within its boundaries. Chief Justice Burger was the only
one to join in the suggestion that the Court should return to the
pre-1937 practice of reviewing congressional judgments on the
impact of local activity on interstate commerce. 165 Rehnquist's
opinion reminded the Court that it can protect the states' re-
served powers not only by erecting a states' rights barrier to an
otherwise valid exercise of federal power, but also by finding in-
herent limitations of Congressional power. The first method was
used in League of Cities; it has not greatly advanced the overall
cause of states' rights. The second method may fare better.
2. Energy Policy
League of Cities was qualified further in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 6' a case that demon-
strates the complicating influence of League of Cities in what
was once a much simpler area of constitutional law. In this case,
the Court reversed the holding of a Mississippi federal district
court which struck down sections of the Public Utilities Regula-
tory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA).1 617 PURPA's most controver-
sial sections contained substantive federal standards for setting
the rates of electricity and gas consumption and the terms and
conditions of gas and electric service.1 68 These standards elimi-
nated declining rates for larger consumers and prohibited utility
companies from recovering advertising costs from consumers. 6 '
While the substantive standards of the Act are not imposed
upon the state utility commissions, the Act does require the
commissions to "consider" the standards and follow certain pro-
cedures (notice, public hearing, written reasons for nonadoption)
when considering them.17 0 Unlike the federal strip-mining stan-
dards at issue in Hodel, there was no provision in PURPA for a
federal agency to regulate private companies in cases of state
165. Id. at 305.
166. 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982).
167. Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat.
3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (Supp. IV 1976)), 15 U.S.C. § 3120 (Supp. IV 1976).
168. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(d), 2623 (Supp. V. 1976).
169. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(d)(2), 2623(b)(5)(Supp. V 1976).
170. Id. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621(b), (c)(2), 2623(a), (c); 15 U.S.C. § 3203(a), (c).
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In his opinion for the Court, Justice Blackmun defused Mis-
sissippi's attempt to apply Justice Rehnquist's Hodel argument
that a regulated intrastate activity must have "a substantial ef-
fect" upon commerce to be brought within the commerce
power.1 7 2 Blackmun said that this argument disregarded both
"the specific congressional finding' 1 73 that the requisite effect
existed and the practice of limiting judicial review to the ques-
tion of whether such findings were "irrational.' 1 74 A brief review
of the legislative history of the Act satisfied him that "Congress
was not irrational in concluding that [the PURPA provisions
were] . . . essential to protect interstate commerce," and, he
concluded, "[t]hat is enough to place the challenged portions of
PURPA within Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.'
17 5
This argument is a straightforward application of the principles
that had governed commerce-clause adjudication during the
forty years prior to League of Cities, and it is unremarkable to
that extent. What may be surprising is that this argument was
made by Justice Blackmun, for it conflicts, at least in tone, with
his concurrence in League of Cities, which employed a balancing
approach to condemn a congressional policy.
176
On the other hand, one can say in Justice Blackmun's be-
half that, after Hodel, balancing will not occur in these cases
unless a court has determined the existence of three other condi-
tions-including whether Congress has regulated "a State as a
State. 1 77 Justice Blackmun did not have to mention balancing
because he effectively decided that Congress had not imposed
the utilities regulation upon the states as states. Blackmun rea-
soned that PURPA did not force the states to regulate the utili-
ties industry in any particular manner because the states could
avoid congressional impositions simply by getting out of the bus-
iness of regulating utilities. 78 Under this argument, the PURPA
171. 102 S. Ct. at 2140.
172. Id. at 2135. See supra notes 155.64 and accompanying text.
173. 102 S. Ct. at 2135.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2136.
176. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
177. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 287-
88 & n.29.
178. Justice O'Connor disagreed, condemning what she termed Congress' decision to
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provisions are analogous to the strip-mining standards in Hodel,
notwithstanding the absence in PURPA of a backup federal
agency in case of state default. 179 Central to Blackmun's view is
the proposition that the commerce power is broad enough to au-
thorize congressional preemption of the -entire field of utilities
regulation.18 0 This enabled him to characterize PURPA as Con-
gress' way of conditioning state activity in a field which Con-
gress is free to preempt altogether. 1'
Blackmun thus announced a new and general doctrine of
constitutional law that Congress can condition state governmen-
tal participation in a preemptible field. This doctrine is analo-
gous to the governing theory of the general welfare clause which
holds that Congress is free to condition state receipt of federal
funds.1 82 The latter is apparently acceptable to the conservative
members of the Burger Court,l'" although the former is not. In
separate partial dissents, Justices Powell and O'Connor argued
that Blackmun's approach suggests that Congress, in Powell's
words, "could reduce the States to federal provinces."'
1
O'Connor contended that Blackmun's new preemption doctrine
could have saved the FLSA amendments in League of Cities be-
cause the states could have avoided the amendment simply by
firing state employees and closing state offices.18 5 Blackmun re-
jected these remarks as unduly "apocalyptic" because the states
perform many functions in fields that are not preemptible.1 8
But much remains of the point made by Powell and O'Connor.
Considering the twentieth century expansion of the commerce
power, the powers of national defense, and the enforcement pro-
visions of the Civil War Amendments, coupled with the modern
view of the necessary and proper clause as authorizing national





182. Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Stewart Machine Co.
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
183. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. For a conservative
argument against unlimited power to condition the receipt of federal funds, see Bailey v.
Drexel, 259 U.S. 20, 36-40 (1922)(Taft C.J.).
184. 102 S. Ct. at 2144.
185. Id. at 2149.
186. Id. at 2142 n.32.
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authority over virtually any problem that might become a "na-
tional problem. 18 7 the range of "preemptible powers" appears
very large and perhaps unlimited in principle. Nevertheless,
pointing this out, as Powell and O'Connor did, is not enough to
settle the issue because the premises of Blackmun's view may be
sound, despite the extreme erosion of states' rights implicit in
his conclusion. The Powell-O'Connor observations serve merely
to dramatize a new plateau in the old and continuing dilemma of
dual sovereignty in America. The conflict in Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi also shows that instead of
ameliorating the problem of dual sovereignty, League of Cities
has fallen victim to it, for the Court has not maintained a work-
able distinction between governmental institutions and their
powers.188 The case suggests that if one concedes that the pow-
ers of one entity can displace the powers of the other, then one
must eventually compromise the institutional integrity of the
subordinate government; this seems to be the broader lesson of
the case. Powell and O'Connor want national supremacy over
private activity and equal or inviolable state and federal govern-
mental structures; these may be incompatible desires. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi exhibits, in any
event, a striking new qualification of League of Cities.
3. State Proprietary Activities
The Court has had an easier time with tenth amendment
challenges to congressional regulation of the so-called proprie-
tary activities of state governments. In his League of Cities
opinion, Justice Rehnquist made it clear that the tenth amend-
ment did not protect state sovereignty in all state functions, but
only in a class of functions called "traditional governmental
functions."18 9 The Court applies the term traditional govern-
mental functions to state activities such as education, police and
fire protection, taxation, health and sanitation.190 The Court de-
fines the meaning of "traditional governmental functions" fur-
187. See generally Barber, supra note 48, at 162-63, 166-74.
188. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
189. 426 U.S. 833, 852.
190. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851; New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946).
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ther by distinguishing them from nontraditional or "proprie-
tary" functions. This latter class of functions is one in which the
state enters fields hitherto occupied by private business. Among
recognized proprietary functions are state-owned liquor stores,191
a mineral water bottling operation,192  and state-owned
railroads.
193
The distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions evolved as part of the Court's attempt to set limits on
the power of both the state and national governments to tax
each other.19 4 The distinction was reaffirmed and extended to
the commerce power in League of Cities partly because cases
upholding state governmental immunities from federal taxation
were the only surviving precedents for Rehnquist's general prop-
osition that the tenth amendment could be the source of affirm-
ative limitations on federal power.' 95 In League of Cities Rehn-
quist simply reasoned that if the tenth amendment could
prevent federal taxation of possessions, institutions, and activi-
ties integral to a state's sovereignty, the tenth amendment could
also limit the commerce power. 9 ' But in reaching this result he
also reaffirmed cases which had permitted federal taxation of
proprietary state activities which were not within the traditional
scope of state sovereignty.1
97
In United Transportation Union v. Long Island Rail
Road,198 the Court quickly and unanimously disposed of a New
York claim of exemption from the Federal Railway Labor Act 9
in a collective bargaining dispute with workers on the state-
owned Long Island Rail Road (LIRR). New York was attempt-
ing to prevent a strike to which the union had a right under the
Railway Labor Act. A federal district court rejected this at-
tempt, citing language in League of Cities that affirmed the ap-
plication of federal law to state-owned railroads on the grounds
191. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
192. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
193. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
194. See generally Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
HARv. L. REv. 633 (1945).
195. 426 U.S. at 841-45.
196. Id. at 843 & n.14.
197. Id. at 854 n.18.
198. 102 S. Ct. 1349 (1982).
199. Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 151.
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that operating a railroad was not an integral part of state gov-
ernmental activity.200 The Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit reversed, reasoning first, that precedent had applied to
freight operations, not passenger operations like the LIRR; sec-
ond, that passenger operations were essential state functions;
and finally, that the state interest in passenger service out-
weighed the federal interest in collective bargaining.20
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, reversed, finding
no relevant difference between freight and passenger services,
and denying, therefore, that a railroad operation fell within what
the third test in Hodel had referred to as "integral operations in
areas of traditional functions. '202 Burger need not have gone fur-
ther because, after Hodel, balancing cannot commence before a
court applies three tests, which include a finding of federal im-
pairment of operations that are integral and traditional.0 3 Nev-
ertheless, Burger did explain what is now almost a century-old
federal concern with the nation's railroad industry.204 In light of
the comprehensive regulatory scheme that resulted from this
concern, Burger found "no justification for a rule which would
allow the States, by acquiring functions previously performed by
the private sector, to erode federal authority in areas tradition-
ally subject to federal statutory regulation.
'20 5
IV. CONCLUSION
For forty years prior to National League of Cities v. Usery
the Supreme Court refused to use the tenth amdnement as a
barrier to federal power under the commerce clause. Since 1937,
the interests of the states have been of no consequence in decid-
ing challenges to the exercise of the commerce power; the federal
government, though limited in its powers, was supreme within
its constitutional sphere. Throughout this period the tenth
amendment was considered not a limitation on the authority of
200. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 509 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
201. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19, 26-27, 29-30 (1980),
cert. granted, 452 U.S. 960 (1980).
202. 102 S. Ct. at 1353.
203. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. at 287-
88 & n.29.
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Congress but merely a "truism" that the powers not granted to
the national government were reserved to the states.2 06 League
of Cities revived the tenth amendment with the doctrine that
state sovereignty sets some limits on the commerce power. No
longer just a truism, the tenth amendment, like the first, fifth,
and sixth amendments, now seems to represent an affirmative
right that a state, when acting in a sovereign capacity, can in-
voke against the exercise of the commerce power.
The decision in League of Cities, as Justice Brennan pre-
dicted, has "astound[ed] scholars of the Constitution. ' 20 7 It de-
parts from the mainstream of judicial doctrine beginning with
John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland and includ-
ing the constitutional theories of Joseph Story,208 Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr.,209 and Harlan Fiske Stone.21 0 Scholars and jurists
have charged the League of Cities majority with usurpation of
the political process, disregard for precedent, and failure to ob-
serve settled constitutional principle. 11 There seems to be more
than a little truth to Justice Brennan's charge that the decision
is an "ill conceived abstraction [which can] only be regarded as a
transparent cover for invalidating a congressional judgment with
which [the justices] disagree."21 Perhaps the case simply
manifests a feeling that Congress went too far in 1974 amend-
ments to the FLSA.
Because the practice of second guessing the economic poli-
cies of Congress has all but disappeared from the Court's deci-
sions since the late 1930s, one cannot expect the typical federal
206. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
207. 426 U.S. at 862 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
208. See SToRY, supra note 64, at §§ 1906-08.
209. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920).
210. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 123-24.
211. See Barber, supra note 46, at 164, 176, 179-81; Choper, The Scope of National
Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552,
1600 (1977); Gibbons, Keynote Address-Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and
Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U.L. REv. 260, 268-70 (1981); Michelman, States' Rights and
States' Roles: The Permutations of State "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1192-93 (1977). Judge Gibbons goes so far as to say: "I know,
as .well as I know my name, that the tenth amendment does not mean what, in National
League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist said it means. Indeed I would be willing to make a
small wager that if a poll were taken among courts of appeals judges, all federal judges,
all state supreme court judges, or all judges, National League of Cities would lose in
each category." Id. at 269.
212. 426 U.S. at 867 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
19831 683
35
Flax: In the Wake of National League of Cities v. Usery: A "Derelict" M
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
judge to be comfortable with the proposition that courts can
now decide when Congress has gone too far in economic regula-
tions of any kind, even those affecting the states. Thus, judges of
the lower federal courts, and even a majority of the Supreme
Court, have insisted on confining League of Cities to its narrow-
est implications. This practice, however, does not contribute to
coherent principles of law; it simply isolates a decision and
makes it an exception to a general pattern of cases. League of
Cities is thus merely an exception to the general rule that states'
rights do not limit federal power. Commitment to principled de-
cision would require that the Court overrule League of Cities or
apply it to all cases falling within its purview. Because he be-
lieves it would be difficult to treat League of Cities as a prece-
dent for other cases, at least one scholar has all but predicted
that it will be overruled. 1 3 Whatever its future, League of Cities
has not yet stood for a new constitutional principle of federal
deference to states' rights.
If no legal principle exists to account for what has happened
to League of Cities, there is at least a sociological explanation. A
well-known study by political scientist Robert Dahl, conducted
in 1957, reviewed 150 years of Supreme Court decisions in an
attempt to see how successfully the Court had opposed the pref-
erences of persistent lawmaking majorities in Congress.2 14 Dahl
found that these lawmaking majorities "generally have had their
way" as new appointees to the Court limit and reverse old deci-
sions inconsistent with national trends.215 While the Court has
held out "in a very small number of important cases. . . up to
as much as twenty-five years, '21 6 Dahl found that "the policy
views dominant on the Court are never for long out of line with
the policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of
the United States. ' 21 7 This last proposition plausibly accounts
for the limited impact of League of Cities. Despite the recent
"Reagan Revolution," the nation still seems relatively uninter-
ested in the rather old fashioned cause of states' rights. For a
213. Barber, supra note 46, at 164.
214. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
215. Id. at 291.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 285.
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general picture of what the nation perceives as its needs, one can
consult the last decade of Gallup polls on the issues most troub-
ling to Americans. Here one sees a much greater public concern
for the energy crisis, jobs, wages and prices, the environment,
crime, race relations, and other national problems than for any-
thing associated with the sovereignty of state governments.2 8
Constitutional conservatives have yet to succeed in adding
states' rights to this list.
As for why the nation's problems are viewed as national
problems and not as problems for the governments of the several
states, one can cite a recent observation that, the principle of
federalism notwithstanding, "the American states have become
ever more similar. The causes of this increasing uniformity have
been many: population migration, improvements in transporta-
tion systems, and the development of nationwide electronic news
media."219 Because the states have grown more alike both so-
cially and economically, there is less need to emphasize separate
solutions to their problems-and, therefore, less need to empha-
size states' rights than there might have been two generations
ago.
If we can appreciate the scholarly criticisms of League of
Cities and if we can explain why it has not been followed in
other cases, there remains a question of what the League of Cit-
ies majority plausibly sought to accomplish. No hard answer is
available, of course, for we have little to go on besides the words
of the Justices themselves. It is unlikely that the League of Cit-
ies majority intended to generally revive states' rights over the
entire range of state-federal relations. Surely the Court's rejec-
tion of the states' rights claims after League of Cities in Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Association, Massachusetts v. United States, and
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi negates
such a conclusion.
218. See G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1972-1977, at 48, 101-02,
186, 230-31, 291, 353-54, 365-66, 443, 534, 655-56, 760-61, 1040, 1169, 1219-20 (1977); G.
GALLUP, THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX, REP. No. 157, 8 (Aug. 1978); G. GALLUP, THE GAL-
LUP OPINION INDEX, REP. No. 167, 7 (June 1979); G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP OPINION INDEX,
REP. No. 181, 10 (Sept. 1980); G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP REPORT, REP. No. 185, 12 (Feb.
1981); G. GALLUP, THE GALLUP REPORT, REP. No. 198, 26 (Mar. 1982).
219. R. FUNSTON, A VITAL NATIONAL SEMINAR: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICAL LIFE 167 (1978).
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What, then, did motivate the League of Cities majority?
Perhaps as good an answer as any can be found in the words of
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Elrod v. Burns. He remarked
that "[o]nly last week, in National League of Cities v. Usery
* . . we took steps to arrest the downgrading of States to a role
comparable to the department of France, governed entirely out
of the national capital. '220 We note that Burger spoke of arrest-
ing the downgrading of states, not of reversing the movement or
of restoring lost prerogatives; perhaps this was the majority's
purpose. If so, League of Cities can be understood as a shotgun
in the closet for use on those special occasions when the Court
believes Congress has gone too far in exercising its power over
the states. But we can also view the decision in more positive
terms, for it serves to remind Congress-indeed, it reminds us
all-that state and local governments are not to be treated as
private businesses subject to any regulation Congress may deem
desirable. League of Cities reminds us that the states retain a
residuum of sovereignty, and that in some areas Congress may
substitute its judgment for theirs only when there is an impor-
tant national need.
220. 427 U.S. at 375 (Burger, J. dissenting).
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